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Abstract—The recent SARS-CoV-2 pandemic gave rise to
management approaches using mobile apps for contact tracing.
The corresponding apps track individuals and their interactions,
to facilitate alerting users of potential infections well before they
become infectious themselves. Naı¨ve implementation obviously
jeopardizes the privacy of health conditions, location, activities,
and social interaction of its users. A number of protocol designs
for colocation tracking have already been developed, most of
which claim to function in a privacy preserving manner. How-
ever, despite claims such as “GDPR compliance”, “anonymity”,
“pseudonymity” or other forms of “privacy”, the authors of these
designs usually neglect to precisely define what they (aim to)
protect.
We make a first step towards formally defining the privacy
notions of proximity tracing services, especially with regards to
the health, (co-)location, and social interaction of their users.
We also give a high-level intuition of which protection the
most prominent proposals can and cannot achieve. This initial
overview indicates that all proposals include some centralized
services, and none protects identity and (co-)locations of infected
users perfectly from both other users and the service provider.
I. INTRODUCTION
The current best practices to manage epidemics or pan-
demics in the face of highly contagious diseases is diligent
contact tracing and self-isolation of potentially infected indi-
viduals so as to restrict the spread. The extensive scale of the
current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has led to calls for automatic
contact tracing. Due to their ubiquity, the suggestions revolve
around proximity detection of cell phones.
A large variety of protocols for this service have been
proposed, some have passed auditing of data protection officers
(the centralized mode of the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving
Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT)1 is one example), and some are
even fully implemented and deployed (e.g., TraceTogether2
in Singapore). Their commonalities include the service func-
tionality (tracing encounters and informing individuals that
The authors are affiliated with, supported by, and/or members of Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology, specifically the Helmholtz Centre for IT Security
“KASTEL”, Huawei, TU Dresden, and the Excellence Centre for Tactile
Internet with Human-in-the-Loop “CeTI” (EXC 2050).
1https://www.pepp-pt.org/content
2https://www.gov.sg/article/help-speed-up-contact-tracing-with-
tracetogether
they are at risk, if they have been in proximity with another
individual that later tested positive for the disease), their
architecture (most protocols assume a server to participate in
the service provision, c.f. PEPP-PT, [1], [2], [8]), and broadly
the fact that they assume some adversaries to aim at extracting
personal information from the service (sometimes also trolls
who could abuse, or try to sabotage the service or its users3).
Most, if not all published proposals claim privacy,
anonymity, or compliance with some data protection regu-
lations. However, none, to the best of our knowledge, has
actually formally defined threats, trust assumptions and ad-
versaries, or concrete protection goals. Albeit their labeling
to be “privacy preserving”, their assumptions, measures, and
achieved protection varies widely.
This greatly complicates understanding, discussion, and
evaluation of the different ideas that are circulated. The authors
sometimes seem to be very focused on preventing one type of
information loss, and term their solution “private” when this
disclosure is prevented, but ignore (intentionally or not) the
remaining disclosures.
We hence make a first step in the direction of systemati-
cally identifying disclosures, and defining privacy notions that
proximity-tracing systems can achieve. These notions revolve
around preventing the leaking of the health conditions, where-
abouts, and social interactions, or habits of the individuals
who participate in the service. We specify assumptions that
fit the majority of circulated protocols first. Then we give
a high-level intuition of seven privacy notions in the flavor
of indistinguishability games. Further, we go on by formally
defining both the data and properties of the service, as well
as the concrete privacy notions. We also provide a very high-
level, initial educated guess as to which privacy notions could,
or cannot be achieved by the most prominent protocols that
are currently circulated. This initial overview indicates that all
proposals include some centralized services, and none actually
protects identity and (co-)location of infected users from both
other users and the service provider.
3We focus on privacy and exclude DoS from our consideration for this
report.
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Through this endeavor we hope to help developers in
improving their designs, to provide better (or: more targeted)
privacy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Functionality
During local infections, contact tracing traditionally is done
by inquiring a patient with a positive test about the people
they have met throughout the characteristic contagion period
of the respective disease, and subsequently calling each of the
identified individuals to ask them to self-quarantine for the
incubation time. This approach is highly privacy invasive, yet
very specific: the tested individual is requested to release all
contact information to the health authorities (or an organizing
institution to which such services are delegated), surrenders
the set of encountered individuals that still come to mind, and
that the person feels comfortable to disclose. The institution
thus gets to know these individuals and quite accurate social
interactions.
Extreme situations, like the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic,
require alternative approaches. We observe that as incubation
periods are long, it is difficult for tested individuals to re-
member all encounters. Further as large numbers of people are
tested positive, manual interviewing and calling of encountered
individuals does not sufficiently scale.
Several suggestions have been made to use location infor-
mation from cell phones for this purpose. They fundamentally
comprise of three functions: sensing potential infection events,
either by tracking all users’ locations, or encounters between
groups of users; deriving “at-risk” (potentially infected) users
upon the event of one user being tested positive; and informing
the at-risk users to take further measures (e.g., self-isolate, get
tested). Note, that at least one bit of information is transferred
to the alerted user, that is, the information that he or she has
met one individual who has tested positive for the virus.
They commonly assume different underlying roles and
participating stakeholders. The most basic assumption is that
individuals are participating as the owners of their mobile
phones (we will call their representation within the app
“users”); individuals may be untested, tested positive, or, after
an encounter with a positive individual, “at-risk”. Testing
at least in Europe is assumed to be performed by medical
professionals. The results of positive tests are collected at
public health authorities, who also take care of informing at-
risk individuals.
B. Design Space and Proposed Solutions
Considering the design space, there is a spectrum of distri-
bution in implementations, which come with somewhat corre-
sponding assumptions about trust into the different entities in
the system.
At one extreme there is trust into service providers and
health authorities. Early suggestions saw carriers collect loca-
tion information, knowing which cell a user is subscribed to at
specific times. They would transmit all location information
to the health authorities, who could take care of extracting
encounters of individuals that have tested positive, and either
directly, or through the cell phone provider contact those
who are at risk. While probably useful to trace mobility of
populations, this data may be too coarse grained, as location
accuracy currently is limited to the order of tens to hundreds
of meters (5G will improve this to the order of centimeters,
restricted to densely populated regions, though).
Location and low distance communication technologies,
however, also allow the direct colocation tracing on the mobile
phones of people in local proximity. A suggestion similar to
the above in regards to trust assumptions and centralization
has been done in the context of Google. Knowing the location
of next to all Android and Google maps users at almost
all times, Google could provide location information, derived
from GPS and WiFi information (or extract encounters, when
being informed about infected individuals/users) in a central-
ized fashion, and either inform the health authorities about
individuals at-risk, or alarm them through their mobile phones
directly.
Both approaches would leave some centralized entities
with total knowledge of everybody’s whereabouts (which
they potentially already collect), and encounters, as well as
information about tested and potential infections, directly tied
to user identifiers or even the actual individuals.
As past experience with centralized entities has shown that
total trust is not always warranted, other approaches are under
discussion. These commonly assume the measurement and
storage of encounters to be done directly on the individuals’
mobile phones (most commonly by exchanging pseudonyms
like ”beacons”, ”tokens”, ”Ephemeral IDs”, or other types of
pseudonyms by local broadcast, and subsequently storing them
on the phone). The infected individual (upon positive testing)
then commonly is assumed to surrender her local information
(commonly the temporal pseudonyms from encounters she
was involved in) to a service provider. These approaches
differ in the choice of centralized or decentralized information
of those at risk: Centralized approaches assume the service
provider to be able to map the pseudonymous colocation
information from the infected user to the users or individuals
at-risk (cf. the mode of PEPP-PT currently discussed for
deployment in Germany), and hence to contact those directly.
Decentralized approaches assume the colocation information
to be published on a public bulletin board in some format
that can be interpreted by all other users, to locally determine
if they are at risk, or not (cf. Canetti [2], or DP3T [8], the
“decentralized” mode of PEPP-PT).
All of the approaches claim some kind of ”GDPR compli-
ance”, or ”anonymity”, or to be ”privacy preserving”. None,
to the best of our knowledge, specifies precisely, what they
actually mean by these terms.
C. Privacy Threats
Considering its functionality, a contact tracing system pro-
cesses the (co-)location of all of its users (in some form) and
the information who has been tested positive for the respective
virus. Processing these two types of information with perfect
knowledge about all users clearly is privacy invasive.
Different approaches hence try to prevent certain threats:
These comprise leaking infection of an individual and potential
infection of an individual, for instance of all those who are
alerted for being at risk. Also leaking infection or potential
infection of a pseudonymous user is a threat, as inverting a
pseudonym and re-identifying the individual may be possible,
sometimes even easy, especially for long-lived pseudonyms,
through different means. Additional threats are leaking the
location of an individual, even the location of a pseudonymous
user (as this may allow for learning the whereabouts of
another individual, tracking of a user, and as previous work
has shown that pseudonymous location information can lead
to very simple re-identification [4]), or encounters of two users
(as personal relationships are intimate information, and even
highly distorted social graph information has been shown to
be easily re-identified [7]). Even leaking aggregate information
could represent a threat, as stigmatization may happen if, for
example, frequencies of infections, or fractions of infected
populations become known for users with certain behavior,
or in certain regions, cities, or probably even specific shops,
companies, or institutions.
D. Adversary and Trust Assumptions
With regard to the adversaries, the common view is that
the systems should protect an individual’s information from
the health authorities (or their delegated service providers),
other users, or third parties who abuse the system for attacks
on the privacy of its users, for instance by placing devices
(Bluetooth antennas, video cameras, corrupted smart phones)
in certain locations. Some approaches consider attacks on the
system itself, like, for instance pollution (illegitimate infection
information, claiming a positive test outcome), or replay/DoS
(re-broadcasting previously received tokens so as to increase
the probability of this user to be alerted for being at risk).
We acknowledge the importance of attacks on the system, but
limit our scope on attacks on the privacy of users within this
report.
The approaches have entirely different trust assumptions:
For the centralized PEPP-PT it is perfectly fine for the service
to learn all encounters of individuals with those who are
infected, but the information of who has been infected is
hidden from all users. Even those who are alerted that they
are considered to be at risk do not learn which or how many
infected individuals they have met. Canetti, Trachtenberg, and
Aria [2] (from here on Canetti) take the opposite stance and
allow the alerted users to learn who of their contacts has been
tested positive4 but hide location traces and colocations from
the service. The same holds for the current available proposal
of DP3T [8]. There the server does not learn any colocation
information itself, but publishes information that allows to
4By way of storing the information which token has been broadcast during
encounters with which other individuals. Also storing the location for each
broadcast token would even allow people who are alerted to recover the
location of each individual that tests positive at the time of encounters.
recreate the entire list of pseudonyms of an infected user. This
essentially again allows other users who stored information
about the time and place of received tokens to perfectly retrace
all colocations with each encountered infected user.
E. Missing Formal Privacy Definitions
No formal privacy definitions and security analyses of the
suggested approaches have been reported so far, to the best
of our knowledge. Cho, Ippolito, and Yu [3] have performed
an informal analysis of the TraceTogether App that is in
use in Singapore, and suggest some improvements to prevent
specific attacks. Vaudenay [9] has reported some specific
vulnerabilities of a version of the DP3T protocol. Neither of
the two, nor any of the protocol descriptions that we could
retrieve has made an attempt to define the potential risk and
formally specify the actual security goals, to make the systems
accessible to formal analysis.
In brief, we identify a dire necessity to formalize the setting,
trust assumptions, and accurate privacy notions in order to
allow for a systematic understanding and discussion of the
different proposals that are circulated, and their flavor of
privacy which they may, or may not achieve.
III. APPLICATION SCENARIO AND ASSUMPTIONS
We will describe some overall terminology, the application
setting, the adversaries, and threats in the following section.
Humans get infected and potentially transmit diseases. We
consider the humans to be individuals, with names (’Alice’,
and ’Bob’). In possession of a cell phone they can become
users with corresponding pseudonyms, some of which can be
(easily) linked back to the individual (the pseudonym hence
inverted or mapped) - like for instance contact information (the
mobile number, or the app identifier). For some pseudonyms
this may not be simple (short term random IDs), or probably
even impossible for others. It is always easy for an individual
to know its pseudonyms (even if they are automatically gen-
erated at random by their mobile app because the adversary
controls the device it is easy for her to observe the pseudonyms
it sends).
A. Functionality
At-risk individuals, i.e. those who have been in the proxim-
ity of another individual that has tested positive in the disease
specific time span5, have to be alerted of their situation. We
assume the notification has to happen at the earliest possible
time.
We make the assumption that recovered individuals may
safely delete the app from their phones, since recovering from
an infection is currently believed to yield immunity6.
5The time span for SARS-CoV-2 could be 14 days before the positive test,
or, according to the current estimate of the excretion period, five days before
the onset of symptoms.
6For the scope of this paper we also assume that individuals who tested
positive safely self-quarantine or are in medical care, and that they disable
or delete the app already during this time. Enabled apps at infected users
could potentially be used for hypothesis testing (passing by somebody’s home
address and checking if this results in an alert), which we disregard for the
moment.
B. Roles
We consider three entities to be involved: the individuals
who install and use the app (and who may or may not
become sick or at-risk), the service, who can either be the
responsible health authorities, or a delegated service provider,
and potential additional third parties, who are running one or
several devices to break the privacy of selected, any, or all
users of the application7.
The effectiveness of a proximity tracing system depends
directly on its adoption, and we hence assume open groups
without access limitations, so it is easy for anybody to partic-
ipate8.
C. Data
The service needs to consider colocation, which translates to
two individuals being at the same location at the same moment.
We hence have to model locations and time.
We do not model location in terms of the coordinates, or
traces of location where users have been. Several analyses
have shown that anonymizing location data, especially when
sequences of positions are known, is very difficult (and most
likely impossible, if any utility is expected to remain). Privacy-
preserving processing or publishing of such data hence comes
at least at a great overhead. Conforming to most of the
discussed protocols (all contestants for implementation as
European solutions), we model colocation as the fact that two
users have been within a defined proximity of each other, no
matter where this encounter has taken place.
Regarding the time, we need to distinguish between two
different intervals:
• Batch time: Each batch groups seemingly simultaneous
events. They are so short (e.g. seconds) that an adversary
cannot recognize the sequence of events in them.
• Retention time (e.g. 2 weeks): The amount of time the
proximity information is needed.
D. Data Processing and Information Loss
We deem personal information of users, and potentially
aggregates thereof, sensitive and aim to analyze to which
extent it is kept private (or, otherwise: lost).
The service processes data, and both functionality and
service provision require transfer of certain information. Like
any relevant privacy-preserving protocol, our service must leak
at least a minimum of information, as otherwise it would have
no utility: Potentially infected “at-risk” users learn at least
7Note, that some approaches model the service to be distributed. PEPP-PT
for instance argues that testing a user is done by professional medical per-
sonnel, who signals the information that a user has tested positive to another,
different service provider; some approaches suggest distributing the service
provider itself, to allow for mixing-approaches, Private Set Intersection-, or
Multi-Party Computation Protocols. We believe that distributing the service
may improve privacy, but we argue that the achieved privacy can be defined
independent of this implementation detail.
8Even though it is out of scope for this work, we want to note that this
does not necessarily entail zero-cost identities and hence unbounded Sybil
attacks, as linking, for instance, installation identifiers to mobile devices, SIM
cards, or phone numbers is possible, and sufficiently secure at least against
opportunistic attacks.
the single bit of information that they are at risk, and hence
have encountered one or some individuals that later have tested
positive. In addition the server, if the protocol design includes
one, will learn at least the fact that it is used, so that users exist.
We do not deem service information (the existence, effort, cost,
etc. of the service provision) worth protecting.
We also limit our analysis to the information that leaks due
to using the service, so that an adversary learns from using
the application, or controlling the service or parts of it, or
combinations thereof.
We do not analyze the secrecy of external (probably private)
information, as it can easily be collected by other means (side
channels like setting up cameras in public places, walking
around town and taking notes of observations, digital dossier
aggregation). It is important to note that we make no as-
sumptions nor statements about such external information,
and, as argued by Dwork [5], that even the smallest loss
of information in combination with external knowledge can
constitute an absolute privacy loss9. Thus, absolute privacy
guarantees can of course not be derived from our analysis
(and most probably not from any other).
E. Adversary
The adversary might participate in any role. It can be a curi-
ous user, the service provider (if the protocol design includes
one), or external third parties. Our formalization of privacy
goals can also be used to analyze colluding adversaries, that
corrupt multiple users, or a user and third parties to learn
private information. Due to the assumption of open groups,
an adversarial service provider can also easily create artificial
users in collusion, so merge the observations at the service
provider and the controlled users.
F. Indistinguishability and Anonymity Sets
Privacy terminally means that observations either cannot
be made, or are impossible for the adversary to link to
specific individuals. Given observations that the adversary can
make, we follow common practice and define anonymity sets:
Anonymity sets group users that are indistinguishable in a cer-
tain protocol for the adversary under a specific privacy notion.
Information that leaks from a privacy-preserving protocol and
that allows to distinguish two users, automatically puts them
into separate anonymity sets (or eliminates their anonymity).
If the anonymity sets thereby get so small that all users in the
set have a certain property in common, then this is property is
of course learned by the adversary. This separation utilizes all
information the selected adversary learns. Starting with public
information (e.g., which region a user belongs to in the work
of Berke et al. [1]), up to information gathered by attacking
the system within the adversarial capabilities.
9It follows that an analysis as done by Vaudenay [9] that tries to assess
absolute privacy given a mixture of side channel (external) information and
protocol-leaks will easily lead to attacks. However, showing achievable, non-
trivial privacy goals, without a definition of privacy, is much harder in the
absolute privacy model given external knowledge of the adversary.
IV. OVERVIEW
We model the privacy notions for proximity-tracing services
as indistinguishability games. An adversary submits two alter-
native scenarios to a challenger who chooses to execute one of
them at random. The adversary subsequently is tasked to guess
which one the challenger chose, based on her observations and
protocol outputs.
We give a brief intuition of the notions we are defining
below and an overview over their relations in Figure 1.
P−IND
M−IND I−IND
M \I−IND R−IND I\|I|−IND
R\I−IND
Fig. 1. Hierarchy of defined notions
A. Intuition of Proximity-Tracing Privacy Notions
Modeling the threats as defined above, in the context of the
protocols that have been proposed and published so far, we
derive the following seven relevant privacy notions:
1) Proximity Tracing Indistinguishability (P−IND):
Other than the service functionality (at-risk individuals
learn that they are at risk) and technical limitations, no
entity learns anything that it does not already know by
trivial observation. Technical limitations include e.g. that
the service learns whether users participate at all.
2) Infection Indistinguishability (I−IND): Individuals
may know who they have met, at-risk individuals are
informed that they met one or several infected individuals
within the contagion period; but they do not learn who
was infected and how many infected individuals they have
met.
3) Infected Indistinguishability (I\|I|−IND): Individuals
may learn the same as in Infection Indistinguishabil-
ity and additionally they may learn how many infected
individuals exist.
4) Meeting Indistinguishability (M−IND): An individual
may learn in how many encounters she was involved and
who is infected, but does not learn who she met, nor
anything about colocation of other individuals.
5) Healthy meeting Indistinguishability (M \ I−IND):
An individual may learn the identity of infected other
individuals and their colocations, but does not learn the
identity of healthy others she encountered nor anything
about colocations between other healthy individuals.
6) Remote Colocation Indistinguishability (R−IND): No-
body learns anything about encounters between two be-
nign individuals (infected or not).
7) Remote Healthy Colocation Indistinguishability
(R\I−IND): Information about the encounters of
infected users can be learned (even if they only
meet benign users), but nothing can be learned about
encounters between two benign, uninfected individuals.
We formally define each notion below, and provide several
examples for valid and invalid scenarios in Appendix C.
V. MODEL
We model events, which the adversary can choose to define
the scenarios, and a notion of time that fits for this purpose. We
borrow the general idea of game based notions combined with
ideas of differential privacy from existing work on anonymous
communication networks and construct the game as in [6].
A. Setting
1) Events: We use U as the fixed set of individuals who
use the proximity tracing app, and further need to model two
events:
Colocation of individuals (Meeting) m(A,B) meaning that
individual A was in proximity of individual B. We
assume this event to be symmetric. Hence, m(B,A)
describes the same event.
Infection of an individual i(A) meaning that A was tested
positive. As we assume such users deinstall the applica-
tion (the user self-isolates and is resistant to the infection
afterwards), the same infection event is not allowed to
occur multiple times.10
Events that follow from these, like creating pseudonyms as
user identifiers, and notifying other users to be tested or self-
quarantine (e.g. B above), will follow from the app protocol
and are not needed for defining the scenarios (they will be,
of course, important for analyzing protocols regarding the
notions, later on).
2) Time: We need a sense of time. Therefore we assume
events to be clustered into batches r = (r1, . . . , rl) with
ri ∈ {m(·, ·), i(·), }, where  is the empty event, i.e. no event
taking place. All events of a batch are assumed to happen
simultaneously (or at least with so little time difference that
the adversary cannot observe their order). Every new batch
contains all events of this defined very short time span11.
The next batch then contains the events of the following
time interval of the same length. Multiple identical colocation
events (e.g. m(A,B) and m(B,A)) are not allowed in the
same batch as one cannot meet someone multiple times at
the same point in time. Further, the information is stored
(and compared) for a chosen retention time; conforming to
t batches.
3) Non-modeled attributes: If needed for the protocol anal-
ysis, we assume that attributes we did not explicitly model are
equal in both scenarios and are chosen reasonable, i.e. such
that the chosen events might happen in the real world. For
example the location at which a corrupted user meets someone
in the batch is fixed and the location of her meeting in the next
10As a reinfaction might be possible, we treat this event as an reinstallation
of the application, which generates a new User ID.
11The precise time span depends on what is considered to be indistinguish-
able for the assumed adversary. We imagine this being in the order of a
second.
batch should be reasonably close. Similarly, if time is used by
the protocol, it is equal in both scenarios for the same batch
index.
B. Game
We first describe the easiest version of the game and then
describe the additional steps that lead to the complete game.
A is the adversary, Ch the challenger and Π the analyzed
protocol.
1) Ch randomly picks challenge bit b.
2) A sends a batch query, containing two batches r0 and
r1 (with potentially many events), to Ch.
3) Ch checks if the query is valid, i.e. both batches differ
only in information that is supposed to be protected
according to the analyzed notion.
4) If the query is valid, Ch inputs the batch correspond-
ing to b to Π.
5) Π’s output Π(rb), i.e. the observations according to
the adversary model, is handed to A.
6) After processing the information, A outputs her guess
g for b.
The analyzed notion (X) is achieved if no PPT algorithm
A can win the game with non-negligible advantage: For all A
exists negligible , s.t.∣∣ Pr[0 = 〈A | Ch(Π, X, 0)〉]−Pr[0 = 〈A | Ch(Π, X, 1)〉] ∣∣≤ 
where Pr[g = 〈A | Ch(Π, X, b)〉] describes the probability
that the adversary A guesses g if the challenger chose b and
simulates Π for the notion X .
Additional Steps:
Multiple Batches Steps 2-5 can be repeated. We call the
combination of all input batches for one challenge bit
a scenario; more precisely for b = 0 the combination of
input batches is the first scenario; for b = 1 the second.
User corruption Instead of Step 2, A can also decide to
issue a corrupt query specifying a user u and receive u’s
internal state as output. This includes that the adversary
gets access to all secret keys and stored information this
user owns. This might change Π’s state, lead to different
behavior of Π in following queries and yield a higher
advantage in guessing than before. Once corrupted users
stay corrupted until the game ends.
Protocol queries Any other input to the protocol (to change
its state) and model active capabilities of the adversary.
C. Notions
Our notions define, what the adversary is not allowed to
learn. The scenarios, which the adversary has to distinguish,
hence have to be identical except for exactly the piece of infor-
mation that the corresponding notion requires to be protected.
The challenger checks for this in its check for validity, in step
3) of the game. To easily describe the allowed differences
in the input batches, we define notions as a combination of
properties. These properties usually require that certain data or
meta data of the real world has to be equal in both scenarios
(i.e. it is not protected by the notion and can be learned by
the adversary).
D. Further notation
Let Ci be the set of corrupted users in the i-th batch, as
defined by the user corruption queries above. We use C as a
shorthand for all Ci’s. Note that by definition of the corruption
query Ci ⊆ Ci+1. We use [x, y] short for {x, x + 1, . . . , y}
and r[x, y] as an abbreviation for all events happening in the
batches rx, rx+1, . . . , ry . We also use to declare that this
part of a tuple can be any value.
VI. PROPERTIES
In this section we describe the properties, i.e. partial infor-
mation about what happens in the real world or is represented
in the protocol. This information may, or may not be desirable
to hide from an adversary. Hiding a certain property is a
characteristic of a specific protocol. The property otherwise
(most probably) can be observed by the adversary as an
artifact of the protocol execution. There certainly are numerous
possible properties that theoretically could be considered. We
restrict ourselves to those properties that we find to be most
insightful, and which seem to relate to the current protocol
proposals, best (Appendix A further elaborates the situation).
A. Informal
Informally speaking, we want a property that helps us
to express that no information leaks, other than what is
unavoidable (necessary for the functionality). Therefore, we
define the unavoidable loss (UL) that per se has to be identical
in both scenarios, as it cannot be protected.
Further, we want to be able to analyze the protection
regarding the information loss about the colocations/meetings
and the infected patients. Therefore, we define a property (Em)
that allows us to easily require that no information about the
colocations, but possibly any information about the infected
users (except for their colocations with other users) is leaked.
We do this by requiring that in both scenarios exactly the same
infection events happen (Em are equal in both scenarios), but
leaving complete freedom of choice to the adversary regarding
the meeting events.
Similarly, we define another property (Ei) that protects
only the information of infected users and fixes the colocation
events.
Achieving strong notions of course is favorable, as any
information leakage may be reason for concern, especially
when considering auxiliary information from external sources.
Some design decisions (local broadcasting of tokens, disclos-
ing the number of encounters to the server, or through the
server to the public, etc), however, may be useful from a
pragmatic perspective, yet systematically prevent protocols
from achieving such strong notions against different adver-
saries. We thus restrict these properties slightly by requiring
for the infected protection that the number of infected users is
equal in both scenarios (as this usually is published anyways)
and for the colocation protection that the colocation events
of infected users might leak (as some protocols leak more
information about the infected users) or the colocation events
of corrupted users might leak (as corrupted users learn the
TABLE I
INFORMAL SUMMARY OF THE PROPERTIES
Notation Name Meaning
Ei Equal except in-
fected
Protects all information about infected,
nothing else
Em Equal except
meetings
Protects all information about meetings,
nothing else
|Ui| Number of in-
fected
The number of infected users is not
protected
|M | Number of meet-
ings
The number of meeting events happen-
ing is not protected
Mi Meetings of in-
fected
Infected peoples’ meetings are not pro-
tected
Mc Meetings of cor-
rupted
Corrupted peoples’ meetings are not
protected (thus identity of meeting part-
ner might be leaked).
UL Unavoidable loss Information assumed to be always
learned by the adversary
pseudonyms of their meeting partners and can link them
to other information in some protocols). We summarize the
intuition of our properties in Table I.
B. Formal Definition
1) Decision space: We first define the properties where
a designer potentially can decide whether this information
should be protected or not.
For all following properties we assume that the adversary
already sent k − 1 batches per scenario and for these the
challenger already checked that each pair was compliant to
the notion analyzed. Now the next pair of batches was sent
by the adversary and we define under which conditions they
are valid. The current batches are thus the k-th batches of the
game: rk0 = (r01, . . . , r0l), r
k
1 = (r11, . . . , r1l).
Definition 1 (Properties): The current batches fulfill the
following properties if:
Equal except infected Ei: any event, that is not an infection
event is equal in both batches12. For b ∈ {0, 1}:
rbj = m( , ) =⇒ r1j = r0j , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , l}
Equal except meetings Em: any event, that is not a meeting
event is equal in both batches. For b ∈ {0, 1}:
rbj = i( ) =⇒ r1j = r0j , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , l}
Number of infected is equal |Ui|: The number of infected
users is equal in both scenarios.
|U0| = |U1|, with Ub = {u | i(u) ∈ rkb}
Number of meetings is equal M : The total number of
meeting events is equal in both scenarios.
|M0| = |M1|, with Mb = {r | r = m( , ) ∈ rkb}
Meetings of infected are equal Mi: No one can be
infected, if their meetings in the last t batches differ in the
12Note that it is sufficient to talk about single batches here, instead of
scenarios as the properties are checked for any input batches and thus the
property holds also for the complete scenarios.
two scenarios. Therefore, we define the set of users whose
meetings in the two scenarios differ at some point in the last
t batches (i.e. at least one user is involved in the meeting of
one scenario that is not in the other) as the set Um. This is the
set of all users u that were involved in a meeting (that was
event j′ of batch j) which differs in at least one user in the
two scenarios.
Um :={u | ∃j ∈ [k − t+ 1, k],∃j′ :
m(u1, u2) = r
j
0j′ ∧m(u3, u4) = rj1j′∧
(u1 6= u3 ∨ u2 6= u4) ∧ (u ∈ {u1, u2, u3, u4})}
We define Mi to be true iff for the set of infected user Ub (Ub
defined as in Number of infected |Ui|):
Um ∩ Ub = ∅.
Meetings of corrupted are equal Mc: No one can be
corrupted, if their meetings in the last t batches differ in the
two scenarios. Um defined as above. We define Mc to be true
for the current set of corrupted users Ck iff
Um ∩ Ck = ∅.
2) Unavoidable information loss: We define properties
that cannot be hidden from the adversary as it belongs to
the intended functionality or we consider it inherent in the
technical solution that is assumed. This is a delicate choice, as
it implicitly – and inaccurately – accepts that some information
cannot be hidden (we will comment on these decisions,
below).
At-risk users always learn at least one bit due to the function
of the service (that they met one or some infected users).
Consider, for example, a user that met only one other user
and then is warned. This trivially discloses that the individual
she met is infected. More generally, also if more users are met:
Unless one limits the functionality13 an adversary can always
trivially distinguish the two scenarios, if her choice leads to
notification (or lack thereof) for different corrupted users in
the two cases. To prevent our game adversary to break our
notions based on this trivial attack type, we add the property
M I→C and require notified, corrupted users to be equal in
both scenarios. Recall that Ci describes the set of corrupted
users in batch i.
Definition 2: At risk corrupted users are equal M I→C:
We want that the same corrupted users get a notification for
being at risk in both scenario. Therefore, we define the set of
users that both get notified and are corrupt, to be equal. The
users that get notified are those that have in the last t batches
been in contact with any infected user ui (whose infection is
detected).
Nb :={u ∈ U | ∃ui ∈ U : i(ui) ∈ rkb
∧ (m(u, ui) ∈ rb[k−t+1,k] ∨m(ui, u) ∈ rb[k−t+1,k]}
13by e.g. allowing false-positives, false-negatives or delaying the warning
Thus requiring the subset of the corrupted notified to be equal
is:
NC0 = N
C
1 , where N
C
b := Nb ∩ Ck.
If a corrupted user meets another corrupted user, she also
knows her identity (MC→C).
Definition 3: Corrupted meeting the same corrupted
MC→C: The same corrupted users have been meeting with
each other in the last t batches.
NC
′
0 = N
C′
1 , where
NC
′
b :={(c1, c2) | c1, c2 ∈ Cj :
(m(c1, c2) ∈ rb[k−t+1,k] ∨m(c2, c1) ∈ rb[k−t+1,k])}
Further, if a corrupted user is tested positive, the adversary
learns this information (UC→i ).
Definition 4: Infection events of corrupted users UC→i :
Every corrupted user is infected at the same time in both
scenarios.
Ui
C
0 = Ui
C
1
Ui
C
b :={u ∈ C
∣∣ i(u) ∈ rbk}
Additionally, if we assume broadcasting of temporal identi-
fiers14 any user learns how many encounters they had. We thus
define QC→m such that the adversary cannot trivially break the
notions based on this knowledge.
Definition 5: Frequency in meeting for corrupted users
QC→m : Every corrupted user had the same number of coloca-
tion events in the last t batches in both scenarios. Therefore,
we define the set of encounters for a user u as:
Mu :={j ∈ [1, l], i ∈ [k − t+ 1, k] |
∃u′ : m(u, u′) ∨m(u′, u) = rbji}
That the amount of encounters per user has to be the equal
for the corrupted users in the last t batches is thus:
QC0 = Q
C
1 , where Q
C
b := {(u, n)
∣∣ u ∈ Ck, n = |Mu|}
If we assume broadcasting of temporal identifiers also the
fact whether multiple corrupted users met the same user at the
same time, is always leaked:
Definition 6: Meeting with corrupted Mc−c: If multiple
corrupted users met the same user in one scenario, they also
all meet one user in the other scenario (although this user
might be a different one with the same health status). Let
U0 be the infected users of the first and U1 of the second
scenario (as in the definition of the number of infected). For
14Note that other assumptions about the technical solution lead to adapted
unavoidable leakage.
all corrupted users c, c′ ∈ Ck meeting an infected user u ∈ U0,
event j, j′ ∈ [1, l] it holds that:
r0j ∈ {m(c, u),m(u, c)} ∧ r0j′ ∈ {m(c′, u),m(u, c′)}
=⇒ ∃u′ ∈ U1 : r1j ∈ {m(c, u′),m(u′, c)}
∧ r1j′ ∈ {m(c′, u′),m(u′, c′)}
Similar for all corrupted users meeting a healthy user.
The combination of these above properties in VI-B2 (the
notified corrupted users, the meetings between corrupted users,
the detection of infections from corrupted user, the frequency
in meetings for corrupted users, and meeting with corrupted)
are trivially available to the adversary. We hence define the
combination to be unavoidable loss:
Definition 7: Unavoidable loss ULC
ULC := M I→C ∧MC→C ∧ UiC→ ∧QC→m ∧Mc−c
VII. NOTIONS
Any combination of the above15 properties, either fixed or
defined by the adversary, constitutes a notion in principle.
We refrain from enumerating all and instead focus on the
combinations that relate to claims or seemingly achieved
protection in the most prominent proposals that have been
circulated, as they seem most relevant.
We illustrate all notions with a short example. Horizontal
lines thereby symbolize the end of a batch, t > 2 and user A
is corrupt.
A. Proximity Tracing Indistinguishability (P−IND)
The adversary only learns what she trivially already knows
or has to learn, but nothing else. This is the strongest notion,
given that the assumptions on the functionality and techno-
logical limits hold. Therefore, the batches have to fulfill the
following property
P−IND : ULC
Example:
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,C)
m(C,E) 
m(A,C) m(A,D)
m(A,C) m(A,E)
i(B) i (E)
i(D) 
B. Infection Indistinguishability (I−IND)
The strongest notion only protecting infections. The batches
only differ in who is infected and we exclude the trivial attacks
as above. Therefore, the batches have to fulfill the following
properties
I−IND : Ei ∧ ULC
Example:
15Of course also any combination of potentially other, additional properties
(like e.g. from Appendix A) defines a notion.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,C) m(A,C)
i(B) i (C)
i(C) 
Notice that this also protects e.g. how many users are
infected, how often someone was colocated with an infected
individual and how many infected individuals someone has
encountered. Thus all users, that had contact to all notified
corrupted users define the anonymity set. In case of many
corrupted users working together and immediate notification
after detection of an infection, this set might still be small in
reality.
C. Infected Indistinguishability (I\|I|−IND)
This notion is a little bit weaker than I−IND as it addi-
tionally allows the number of infected app users to be learned
by the adversary. Therefore, the batches have to fulfill the
following properties
I\|I|−IND : Ei ∧ |Ui| ∧ ULC
As infection numbers are usually published (albeit cumulated
and after some delay), we do not consider this privacy loss as
very critical.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,C) m(A,C)
i(B) i (C)
D. Meeting Indistinguishability (M−IND)
This is the strongest notion that only protects meetings. The
batches can only differ in who met, but not who is infected.
Therefore, the batches have to fulfill the following properties
M−IND : Em ∧ ULC
Example:
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,C)
m(A,D) m(A,D)
m(C,D) 
i(B) i (B)
i(C) i (C)
This notion does not define protection of who is infected,
but who someone met, and in consequence where someone
has been.
E. Healthy meeting Indistinguishability (M \I−IND)
We now relax the above. This notion only protects the
meetings of healthy people, the identity or location of infected
individuals may be disclosed. As soon as someone is infected,
her whole meeting history is allowed to leak. This means only
users whose meetings are identical before can be infected (as
stated earlier we assume that infected users self-isolate and
have no later meetings). Therefore, the batches have to fulfill
the following properties
M \I−IND : Em ∧Mi ∧ ULC
Example:
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,C) m(A,D)
m(C,D) 
i(B) i (B)
F. Remote Colocation Indistinguishability (R−IND)
Except for meetings with corrupted users and the number of
edges in the colocation graph16, no information about it leaks.
Therefore, the batches have to fulfill the following properties
R−IND : Em ∧ |M | ∧MC ∧ ULC
Example:
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,C) m(A,C)
m(B,C) m(C,D)
i(B) i (B)
G. Remote Healthy Colocation Indistinguishability
(R\I−IND)
Except for meetings with corrupted users and the number
of edges in the colocation graph, no information about the
colocation graph between non infected users leaks. Therefore,
the batches have to fulfill the following properties
R\I−IND : Em ∧ |M | ∧MC ∧Mi ∧ ULC
Example:
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,C) m(A,C)
m(B,C) m(B,C)
m(E,C) m(C,D)
i(B) i (B)
H. Hierarchy
By definition of the notions, and the corresponding limita-
tions in the valid adversarial choices, this hierarchy follows:
This hierarchy especially means that if P−IND is achieved,
any other defined notion is achieved as well; and if R\I−IND
and I \|I|−IND are both not achieved, none of the defined
notions is achieved. Further, the notions protecting all meet-
ing information M−IND and M \ I−IND also imply the
notions protecting the respective social graph (R−IND and
R \ I−IND) and are hence stronger and better connected
to each other than to the notions concerned with differing
infection events (I−IND and I \ |I|−IND). However, there
might be useful weaker notions that are both implied by
16This notion can be easily adapted to protect the number of edges in the
colocation graph by removing |M |.
P−IND
M−IND I−IND
M \I−IND R−IND I\|I|−IND
R\I−IND
Fig. 2. Hierarchy of defined notions
notions concerned with meeting information and by notions
concerned with infection information, e.g. how many meetings
an infected user had earlier.
VIII. NOTES ON EXISTING APPROACHES
Analyzing a protocol regarding a notion is only meaningful
under the assumption of a certain adversary and regarding
different adversaries the results for the same notion and
protocol can differ. For this first short review we are concerned
with the adversary model that corrupts only clients and the one
that corrupts only the server.
For our educated guess, we utilize existing implications
between the notions, i.e. if we expect that a strong notion
is achieved this includes that all weaker, implied notions
are achieved as well. Further, we use a similar logic for
adversaries; if a weak adversary (e.g. one corrupting only
one client) is expected to break the notion, a strictly stronger
adversary (e.g. one corrupting multiple clients) is too.
We are limiting our short review of the state of the art in
three ways:
a) Reusing of Pseudonyms ignored: As long as the
broadcast pseudonym is not changed, multiple meetings can
trivially be linked (see Appendix B for a corresponding
notion). This means that for this time span the user’s meetings
are traceable, if the adversary is able to observe the area, or at
least manages to incur several encounters. As the information
how long a pseudonym is reused is important, we include this
parameter in the table. Other than that, we ignore this attack
vector for the moment, i.e. we assumed that any batch uses
new unlinkable pseudonyms, to get a feeling for the protection
introduced by the other design decisions.
b) Location Information ignored: Some protocols lever-
age location information to calculate the at-risk users. As this
of course is an important private information, we include it
in our table as well. Other than that, we however ignore this
information at the moment. In terms of our security games
we thus assume that the locations do not differ between
the scenarios, i.e. the same location is being used for the
corresponding meeting of the second scenario as the one used
in the first scenario. Also the location of one user in one
batch does not change and locations of the same user in two
consecutive batches are assumed to be reasonably close.
c) Educated Guess: We have not performed in-depth
analyses of the protocols in detail, and do not present any
proofs. This is partially due to time17, partially due to the fact
that explicit specifications sometimes are not public (we rely
on a project draft for the centralized PEPP-PT) or moving
targets (DP3T is under heavy development at the moment,
several other approaches are published in technical reports
with frequent updates). We merely provide an educated guess
of reasons, why some approaches systematically may, or may
not achieve specific notions. A summary of this guess can be
found in Table II (the results for one and multiple clients are
expected to be identical).
A. Centralized location tracing server18
Clients: This approach may protect perfectly from cor-
rupted clients as they do not have to share information with
other clients, but only with the server.
Server: The server learns the locations of all users at
all times. Thus, it learns even more information than the
colocation events that we modeled here.
Notions: P−IND should hold for multiple adversarial
clients as they never exchange any information with non
adversarial clients and only learn unavoidable information
(that they are at risk, if this is the case) from the server.
R \ I−IND and I \ |I|−IND are broken for an adversarial
server, as it learns all meeting events and infection status for
all users. This implies that all other notions are broken as well.
Further of course the exact location information is leaked
and identities are known to the server.
B. PEPP-PT (central comparison)19
Client: As clients only learn the temporary identifiers
(and we ignore trivial linking due to pseudonym reusal during
extended periods of time, for the moment), clients only get
notified about whether they are at risk, we expect that one
client cannot learn anything about the meetings or who is
infected. Multiple clients can however still learn about meeting
the same user as the same pseudonym is broadcast to all.
Server20: The server learns all short-term pseudonyms
seen during all encounters of users who test positive, and the
long-term pseudonym of the latter. The short-term pseudonyms
can be inverted and hence directly mapped to the correspond-
ing users. Literature shows that linking long-term pseudonyms
(app IDs, cell phone numbers) to the identity of individuals
is trivial, or at best represents a very light obstacle to any
17We believe that providing the formalization of privacy goals as notions is
more pressing at this point in time, to help the various developers understand
and express their goals and approaches better.
18The naive solution assumed in the background (Section II). Note,
that Google and Apple recently advertised they wanted to develop their
own co-location system. There currently are no specifications available but
from what they hint they seemingly plan following the Canetti approach,
which we discuss below, and not a centralizes location tracing server;
https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/
19We rely on an unpublished project draft.
20The server is assumed to be trusted in this setting: The centralized PEPP-
PT description argues that at-risk individuals can be alerted directly by the
service, who consequently needs to know who they are. The server thus learns
everything about all individuals who test positive and all their encounters, our
notions hence do not match the adversary model of the developers in a very
useful manner.
TABLE II
AN INITIAL APPROXIMATION FOR PROPOSED PROTOCOLS (FORMAL PROOFS, AND IN MANY CASES EVEN EXACT PROTOCOL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT
EXIST YET)
Proposal Adversary P−IND I−IND I\|I|−IND M−IND M \I−IND R−IND R\I−IND Location? Pseudonyms reused?
central tracing server client(s) X X X X X X X exact forever
server X X X X X X X exact forever
PEPP-PT client(s) X X X X X X X no nth part of day (15min)
server X X X X X X X no nth part of day (15min)
Canetti client(s) X X X X X X X no never
server X X X X X X X no never
MIT (PSI) client(s) X X X X X X X region no pseudonym
server X X X X X X X region no pseudonym
DP3T client(s) X X X X X X X no nth part of day
server X X X X X X X no nth part of day
strategic adversary, especially with knowledge about the ego-
network of the respective victim.
Notions: Corrupted clients only learn the tokens of each
batch and the bit about whether they are at-risk, as the fact
that multiple users learn that they are meeting the same user
due to the broadcast is considered unavoidable leakage, for the
moment. As the tokens cannot be linked (again: we ignore the
reusage of the pseudonyms for 15 minutes in this analysis)
and the bit is considered unavoidable information, P−IND
is expected to be achieved (and thus also any other defined
notion), even against multiple clients in such a restricted
analysis.
A corrupted server is expected to break R−IND and I \
|I|−IND . As the server notifies the at-risk users and thus
learns about their meeting with infected individuals, it learns
about the meetings between these users (and most likely even
their identities). As the notified honest users can differ in both
scenarios for I\|I|−IND , this notion is also expected to break.
Only the notions that allow the adversary to learn about the
meetings of infected R\I−IND and M\I−IND are expected
to hold, as the server only learns the short-term pseudonyms
infected users met and nothing about the meetings between
non-infected users is shared with the server.
C. Canetti [2]
Clients: Non-infected users only share one-time
pseudonyms with other user, so we expect the meetings of
them to be nearly completely private. Infected users send all
own temporal identifiers to the server. All users receive the
list of pseudonyms of infected users, as it is stored on the
server.
Server: The server receives all the identifiers that the
infected users sent out.
Notions: M−IND and I\|I|−IND are expected to break
for a single adversarial user, as the user learns in which batch
the match with an infected user occurs and thus the user has
a good guess which the infected user was (knowing when she
met him: I\|I|−IND) or when she met him (knowing when the
other user gets infected:M−IND). We expect M\I−IND and
R−IND to hold against that adversary, as the adversary does
not learn about meetings of non-infected users, or meetings
she is not involved in. As only the own keys of the infected
users are published, it does not contain meeting information.
I−IND is expected to break for an adversarial server, as
it can observe how many batches of tokens she gets and
thus learns the number of infected users. However, given the
tokens are sent to the server in a protected way (via a secure
anonymous communication network), the server cannot infer
the identity from the tokens or any meeting information (as
above). We thus expect a corrupted server (not colluding with
any clients) to achieve the other notions.
Note that the publishing of all tokens of the infected users
leaves them traceable by multiple corrupted users, if only one
user has been infected in this period (if there have been several,
they create an anonymity set). This should be analyzed in
future work (see Appendix B).
D. MIT [1]
Clients: Clients are assumed to have met if they are in
the same region. Clients do not directly exchange information,
every communication happens over the central regional server.
Infected clients use generalization to obfuscate their location
and time, before regularly publishing this information to a
database. Non-infected clients run a Private Set Intersection
(PSI) or PSI-Cardinality (PSI-CA) protocol together with the
database server to find out whether they have been at the
same obfuscated location at the same time span as one of
the infected clients. We assume that this PSI does not return
duplicated set entries (no multi sets). The client learns either
the obfuscated location and time for any match in the database
(PSI) or the number of matches (PSI-CA).
Server: The server receives regular input from infected
users, so he learns the number of infected users. As obfuscated
location-time tuples are generated in a deterministic way,
infected users that meet in the same generalized location at
the same time will generate the same information to be sent to
the server. The server thus learns a histogram over the number
of infected people over time that meet at the same location.
Depending on the chosen PSI or PSI-CA scheme, the server
also can (on its own, or together with a colluding client21),
perform a bruteforce attack on the time span and obfuscated
location reported by any infected user.
21He can simply take part in the open world app as a user.
Notions: Note that the hashed obfuscated location-time
value stored at the server and received by the clients can be
efficiently resolved to the obfuscated location and time by
a dictionary first preimage attack (in polynomial time in the
security parameter).
M−IND and I \|I|−IND are expected to break for cor-
rupted clients as they can learn in which batch they had contact
to a corrupted user (as above for Canetti). The other (not yet
implied to be broken) notions are expected to hold for this
adversary as corrupted users learn no meeting information
about users they did not meet or that are not infected, as they
can only check for their regional information against regions
infected have been in.
R−IND and I−IND are expected to break for an adver-
sarial server, as he learns the (obfuscated) location and time
of infected users and can reconstruct a partly social graph and
number of infected users. Further, I\|I|−IND is expected to
break as the server can learn about two infected users that they
have met (been at the same region at the same time) and thus
can construct a scenario, where these met and another where
the two infected (different users than in the first scenario)
did not meet, even though in both the same number of users
is infected and the same users (identities) met. We expect
M \I−IND to hold, as the server does not get information
about the meetings of non-infected users (if the PSI is secure).
Note that the description of possibly achieved notions does
not leverage the location stored in the obfuscated location-time
tuple. This is due to our assumption that location of adversarial
users is identical in the same batch for the moment and should
be analyzed in future work.
E. DP3T [8]
Clients: Clients continuously broadcast a cryptographic
token via bluetooth. This token is derived from a temporary
key. The key is supposed to have a validity of roughly one day.
The next key is derived from the current temporal key. Each
temporal key generates n tokens, which are used one after
another over the lifetime of the temporal key. Clients receiving
such tokens are storing them together with a timestamp and
signal strength. In case of an infection, the app of the infected
user sends the temporal key together with a validity timespan
to the server. Once a day, each client receives the server list of
keys and their validity. It generates all belonging tokens and
possibly finds matches with recorded tokens.
Server: The server receives a tuple consisting of a
temporal key and its validity in case of an infection. Clients
request the list of tuples once a day.
Notions: As above (for Canetti and MIT), M−IND and
I\|I|−IND are expected to be broken for a corrupted client,
as she learns in which round she met an infected user (she
calculates the matches on her own). However, we expect the
other (not yet implied to be broken) notions to hold, as again
nothing about the non-infected meetings, or meetings that do
not involve a corrupted user, can be learned.
Similar to the case with Canetti, an adversarial server learns
the number of infected users (from the number of keys it
gets sent) and thereby breaks I−IND . However, other than
that the server only learns the keys of infected, but no further
meeting information and thus we expect the other notions (not
yet implied to be broken) to hold.
Note that the publishing of keys of the infected users allows
to derive all sent tokens of this user and leaves her traceable
by multiple corrupted users. This should be analyzed in future
work (see Appendix B).
F. Summary
On this high-level overview the different approaches already
show trade-offs between trust in different entities of the
application and the connected privacy leakage.
With complete trust in the server (the central location data
collection, e.g. the “Google Maps”, approach) it is relatively
easy to ensure our strongest privacy goal against adversar-
ial clients, even if several of them collude. Limiting the
information the server learns about colocations (the PEPP-
PT approach), multiple clients might infer some information
about other users’ meetings22, while the server still learns
enough to break nearly all our notions; the only information
protected, and hence notions achieved, relate to the encounters
between healthy, benign users. By moving the calculation of
a warning to the clients (Canetti approach, DP3T) we think it
is possible to achieve most of our notions against a corrupted
server, at the cost of even a single client breaking some of our
notions. Interestingly, a completely different approach (MIT),
calculates the meetings and warnings at the central server,
but is expected to achieve (in our current notions) the same
protection from corrupted clients. At the same time it however
puts more trust and information at the server.
Slightly more general insights are that re-use of pseudonyms
will likely improve the possibilities of any adversary to break
notions, as throughout the reusal time the colocations can be
linked, and the corresponding user hence can be excluded
from the anonymity sets of other encounters at the same time.
Another point is that we consider observed pseudonyms to be
unavoidable leakage, which is only due to the fact that we
assume the tokens to be transmitted via a broadcast medium
(which all promising contestants for a privacy-preserving
solution in Europe currently are suggesting, using 128-bit BLE
tokens). It fundamentally is possible to share them unicast in
an encrypted fashion. Bystanders then cannot observe them,
and each pseudonym relates to only the tuple of two users that
participate in the concrete encounter. Solutions following such
an approach are expected to provide better protection against
colluding clients.
Further, we have repeatedly sketched attacks against our
strong notions by exploiting that a user learned the fact
that and when she met an infected user. With the current
functionality and the goal to calculate the warning at the client
this seems challenging to avoid. An easier circumvention of
22The information inferred by multiple clients in the PEPP-PT approach is
in our current analysis considered unavoidable leakage.
this problem would be to allow for added delays and collect
information to infer warnings for this time23.
IX. POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
Other Unavoidable Leakage: A relaxation of the func-
tionality or assumptions of the used techniques would lead to
other unavoidable leakage. Especially that the frequency of
meetings for corrupted users and the meetings with corrupted
is inherent in the underlying assumption that broadcasting
techniques for some temporary identifiers are used, which
the most important proposals do, but it is not inherent in the
desired functionality.
Different Levels of Meeting Intensity and Notifications:
Our meeting event can be extended by a parameter that
specifies the level of intensity or duration of a meeting. For the
notions one would then again need to specify which meeting
intensity each of the properties considers.
More timing information for the infection: If health
workers define the point of being contagious differently than
t time units before the detection, this information can be
modeled as part of the infection event and the notions that
consider the calculation of warnings can be adapted to make
statements about the corresponding times.
Adding Locations: Challenging the adversary to distin-
guish scenarios based on the location at which users are, is
certainly interesting in the future for approaches that collect
some form of location data. For the approaches that do not
collect such location data in the beginning, such notions
are trivially achieved. Modeling locations such that only
reasonable inputs can be given by the adversary makes this a
challenging task for future work, e.g. the locations of the same
honest user in consecutive batches should be close, people that
are sufficiently close should have a meeting event and different
dimensions of location (GPS coordinate and height) possibly
have to be considered.
Epochs of reused pseudonyms: Many protocols are based
on epochs, in which one pseudonym is used. The pseudonym
is only changed for the next epoch. If all users synchronize
their epoch changes (epochs are based on a global timer),
it is easy to model. We can simply understand an epoch as
the encapsulation of the batches that correspond to its time
and extend properties as needed to consider events of this
larger time span. If however all users change epochs based on
their local time, the adaption of the properties is no longer
straightforward and should be subject of future work.
Friends, Family and People with same Routine: If one
wants to model that no protection from friends and family
is needed (as one might assume they share the information of
being infected anyways), one can restrict the scenarios to only
differ in infected users that do not meet more often than one
expects people with the same routine to meet. Similarly the
additional requirement that only people with the same routine
differ in their infected status in the two scenarios, can be added
23The concrete analysis of this would however need an adapted notion that
forces the adversary to include multiple infection events in this time span.
as restriction (if one assumes that only regular met people are
at risk as completely random encounters can most likely not
be identified anyways [8]).
Assumed behavior after detection of infection: We as-
sumed that users with a detected infection strictly self-isolate
and deinstall the application as they have no more meetings.
Without this assumptions further attacks are imaginable, like
testing the infection status by provoking meetings with the
victim, and changes on the properties would be necessary, e.g.
Mi would also need to ensure that meeting of an infected user
after the infect was detected are equal in both scenarios.
Sybil-Attacks: An easy attack is that an adversarial user
ensures to meet only one user (by blocking later exchange of
colocation data, i.e. temporal pseudonyms). If this adversarial
user receives a warning, the adversary knows that the one
met user is infected. If the adversary can easily create many
identities, she can do this attack for many victims. As a
countermeasure against this attack sybil-protection measures
might be introduced into a protocol. The effect of such
measures can be translated into our model by limiting the
number of clients the adversary is allowed to corrupt. However,
to also observe an effect on the notions, they have to adapted
such that an adversary cannot pick arbitrarily many differences
between the scenarios. Such a quantitative restriction of the
notions can be done similar to the number of challenges in [6].
Relaxation of Advantage definition: As done before for
anonymous communication networks, in some cases the strict
advantage definition is too strong and allowing to distinguish
with a non-negligible, but still very small probability is ac-
ceptable. Therefore, the advantage definition can be adapted
similar to the (, δ)-differential privacy definition. However,
the properties can be kept the same and the same hierarchy
follows.
X. CONCLUSION
The current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has spawned a plethora
of protocol proposals for contact tracing using cell phones. The
goal is to facilitate an automated system that warns people who
have encountered others who have tested positive and may
have been contagious during the meeting. All of the proposals
we have found claim some form of “privacy”, “anonymity”, or
at least compliance with data protection regulations. However,
they describe a large variety of approaches, which implicitly
all seem to target entirely different protection goals. Although
a few security analyses of some approaches exist, there is no
systematic definition what privacy-preserving contact tracing
actually means, and no formal definition of the privacy notions
that correspond to the targeted protection goals. Formal defini-
tions do not only facilitate a systematic security analysis, they
also provide means to compare different protocol proposals
with respect to the protection they actually offer, and we
hope that they will help design better, more privacy-preserving
protocols in future.
We hence undertook a first step towards formally defining
privacy notions for proximity tracing apps. We defined seven
fundamental notions in the style of indistinguishability games,
with a focus on protecting the identities, health conditions,
locations and social interactions of the users, and sketched
their dependencies. Applying them to some of the more
prominent contestants in the current discussion, we also gave
an educated guess about how these compare. This allowed us
to learn important lessons about their design decisions, and
the complexity of the problem.
Our discussion indicates, that none of the current proposals
can protect identity and colocation information of infected
users from both other users and the service provider. Ap-
proaches that suggest to detect potential contagion on the
users’ phones allow colluding adversarial clients to trace in-
fected users. Those that suggest this function to be performed
on the server allow the service provider to learn the set of
alerted users, and leak some colocation information to the
provider. We also learned that the choice to broadcast tokens
will greatly complicate protection from colluding adversaries,
and that frequencies of encounters are much harder to hide,
than we initially would assume.
We assumed the use of unique, short-term pseudonyms, in
this work, but observe the desire to reuse pseudonyms for
extended periods, to ease calculating risk-scores of colocated
users, with privacy. Our current efforts hence are to extend
the analysis framework to cover reuse of pseudonyms in
a meaningful manner. The framework currently models en-
counters as the simple colocation of two individuals. Some
approaches recommend to use traces of actual positions of
single individuals to extract encounters by comparing such
traces. Despite the fact that the current majority opinion seems
to be that such approaches will be either insecure or extremely
costly, we are also aiming to integrate such data into our
model.
Our initial attempt already helped to classify the approaches,
and provide insight about the protected properties and trade-
offs. We would like to stress, that our discussion does not
represent an in-depth analysis, yet – some protocols are still
in the process of redesign, for other protocols no public
specifications exist, and that we have not proven any of the
statements, so far. A future formal analysis with our notions
will help uncover more intentional and unintentional leaks. It
can therefore provide tremendous value to the discussion and
choice of protocols for deployment, and help to design better
protocols in the future.
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APPENDIX
A. More Properties (Overview)
We systematically discuss ad-hoc properties interesting for
privacy notions of proximity tracing applications in this sec-
tion. We limit this version to an informal introduction of them.
A formal definition similar to [6] is future work.
1) Infections: Two protectable properties only concern in-
fection events:
Set of infected users Ui: Who is infected (all or a subset
of the infected users) is known or not known to the
adversary.
Number of infected |Ui|: How many app users are infected
is known or not known to the adversary. The number of
infected is usually made public in regular time intervals.
However, an earlier or more fine grained information
about this might be desirable to hide.
2) Meetings: Properties that only concern user meetings
and no infections: With regard to single users:
Complete meeting info per user CIu: This information
contains a list of all meeting events this user was in.
This includes who a user met, how often and in which
order.
Meeting sets M : This only includes which other user each
user met, but not how often or in which order.
Frequency in users Qu: This specifies for any user, how
many users a she met.
Frequency per user Q: This specifies for any user, how of-
ten she met any other user.
Frequency in meetings Qm: This contains for any user, the
number of meeting events she had.
With regard to multiple users:
Complete meeting information CI: This lists all meeting
events that happened. Compared to CIu this also allows
to infer the order of meetings from different users.
Partitioning P : This specifies the subset of users, in which
each user met at least one other user of the set (connected
components in the meeting graphs) in a given time span.
Histogram H: This specifies how many users met how many
users (e.g. 10 users met 1 user each, 5 users 2 etc. ).
3) Combined: Properties that arise form meeting infected
users: With regard to single users:
Complete meeting info restricted to infected CI→Iu : This
lists all meetings with infected users the considered user
had. It includes which infected user she met, how often
and in which order.
Meeting set restricted to infected users M→I : This spec-
ifies which infected users a user met.
Frequency in infected users Q→Iu : This specifies how many
infected users a user met.
Frequency per infected user Q→I : This specifies how of-
ten a user met a certain infected user, for each infected
user.
Frequency in meetings with infected users Q→Im : This
specifies how many meeting events with infected users
each user had.
With regard to multiple users:
Complete information restricted to infectes users CI→I :
This lists all meeting events with infected users involved.
Histogram restricted to infected users. H→Im : This speci-
fies how many users met how many infected users.
In short, we restrict the properties above to only take the
infected users into account X→I in the combined properties.
We can also turn this around to describe which infected user
met which other users and restrict the statistics on the infected
users XI→. With regard to single users:
Complete meeting info for infected CII→u lists all events
in which an infected user is involved (as CI→Iu ).
Meeting sets for infected M I→ specifies which users any
infected user met (not the same as M→I , but includes
same information).
Frequency in user per infected QI→u specifies how many
users an infected user met (different information than
Q→Iu ).
Frequency per user for infectedQI→ specifies how often
an infected user met another user (different information
than Q→I ).
Frequency in meetings for infected QI→m specifies how
many meeting events with users each infected user had
(different information than Q→Im ).
Similarly, we can restrict this for contact of infected users
under each other: XI→I .
Note on other user sets: Similarly, we can restrict these
properties on any other subset of users. Especially, the cor-
rupted users are useful in the unavoidable leakage: X→C ,
XC→ and XC→C .
B. Tracing of users
A typical goal is that the colocation events of a user at
different times cannot be linked to each other, as otherwise
the complete movement of the user could be traced by an
adversary. To capture this protection in a notion, we need a
property that ensures that in the first scenario the same user
was met twice and in the second two different users were met.
Example (A corrupted):
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,B) m(A,C)
However as we do not want the adversary to win the
scenarios by identifying the user only in the first meeting,
we need to ensure that this alternative is used in 50% of the
games:
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,C) m(A,C)
m(A,C) m(A,B)
Formally, such a property requires small extensions to the
game, but can be constructed similar to TS in [6]. Note that
depending on how close these two batches are, this idea is
able to capture the leakage due to reused pseudonyms (if the
batches are so close that still the same pseudonym is used,
e.g. directly after each other as in the example above) or to
cover the leakage due to linkable pseudonyms (if we force the
adversary to compare batches that are in different pseudonym
epochs).
C. More examples
As one could come up with arbitrary many examples, the
following list is not entitled to be complete in any sense. For
all exampls horizontal lines symbolize the end of a batch,
t > 2 and A,A′, A′′ are corrupt users.
1) Proximity Tracing Indistinguishability P−IND : Not
Valid: Different corrupted users are infected:
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
i(A) i(A’)
Corrupted user has different number of meetings in both
scenarios.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,C)
m(A,C) 
Corrupted user meets different other corrupted users in both
scenarios.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,A’) m(A,A”)
Corrupted user gets a warning in one, but not in the other
scenario.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,C)
i(B) 
Two corrupted users met different number of different
people in the same batch.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,C)
m(A’,B) m(A’,D)
Valid:
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,C)
m(B,D) 
i(D) i(B)
and any other valid input of any other notion.
2) Infection Indistinguishability I−IND: Not Valid: Dif-
ferent meetings happening.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(B,C) m(C,D)
and any example not valid above.
Valid: How many users are infected?
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
i(B) i (C)
i(C) 
How often did someone meet an infected?
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,C) m(A,C)
i(B) i (C)
How many infected did someone meet?
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,C) m(A,C)
i(B) i (C)
i(C) 
and any valid example of I\|I|−IND
3) Infected Indistinguishability I \ |I|−IND: Not Valid:
Different number of infected:
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
i(B) i (C)
i(C) 
and any example not valid before.
Valid: How often did someone meet an infected?
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,C) m(A,C)
i(B) i (C)
How many infected did someone meet?
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,B)
m(A,C) m(A,C)
i(B) i (C)
i(C) i(D)
4) Meeting Indistinguishability M−IND: Not Valid: Dif-
ferent infected.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
i(B) i (C)
and any example not valid for P−IND .
Valid: How many meeting did an infected have?
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(B,C) 
m(B,D) 
m(B,E) 
i(B) i(B)
Who did an infected meet?
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(B,C) m(B,D)
i(B) i(B)
and any valid example below.
D. Healthy meeting Indistinguishability M \I−IND
Not Valid: Different meetings for infected.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(B,C) m(B,D)
i(B) i(B)
Different number of meetings for infected.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(B,C) 
m(B,D) 
m(B,E) 
i(B) i(B)
Valid:
Who did a corrupted user meet?
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,C)
How many meetings happened (under honest users)?
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(B,C) 
and any example valid under R\I−IND
E. Remote Colocation Indistinguishability R−IND
Not valid: Corrupted user meets different people.
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,B) m(A,C)
Number of meetings differs:
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(B,C) 
and any example not valid above for P−IND ,M−IND .
Valid: Who did meet with whom (under honest users)?
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(A,C) m(A,C)
m(B,C) m(C,D)
i(B) i (B)
and any example valid for R\I−IND .
F. Remote Healthy Colocation Indistinguishability R\I−IND
Not valid: Different meetings of infected users:
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(B,C) m(B,D)
i(B) i (B)
and any example not valid above for
P−IND ,M−IND , R−IND ,M \I−IND .
Valid: Who did meet with whom (under honest, non-
infected users)?
Scenario 0 Scenario 1
m(B,C) m(B,D)
